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INTRODUCTION

The rules governing states' conduct in times of war have always been
the topic of heated discussion during, or in the wake of, major international conflicts. Such was the case, for example, following the increasingly "modern" and destructive wars of the late nineteenth century
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(which were followed by the adoption of the Hague Conventions)' and
after World War II (which led to the Geneva Conventions).2 In the midst
of the current "war on terror"-which is characterized by the emergence
of non-state entities as key protagonists -calls are heard, yet again, to
reconsider the rules governing warfare.
The urge to revisit the laws of war today stems from the realization that
the rules currently in place are based on at least three assumptions that
may no longer be valid today. The first assumption is that states wage
war against states. Ever since Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the belief that war
is waged among states has prevailed.3 Although the assumption that
states have a monopoly over the use of force seems out of sync with the
"war on terror" and other modern conflicts,4 it has become so deeply embedded in the international legal system that we have trouble deviating
from it.' The second assumption that may no longer be applicable is that
1. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are among the first legal instruments
governing the conduct of hostilities. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention of
1907]; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]. They focus, respectively, on the use of such modern weaponry as asphyxiating gases, hollow point bullets and
balloons used to launch explosives (weapons then making their way into use across
Europe), and on modern naval warfare. The Geneva Protocol to the Hague Convention,
signed in 1925, was designed to prohibit "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices." Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65. Adopted in the aftermath of World War I, the Geneva Protocol was a direct response to the use of mustard gas
and other agents in the recent fighting. Id.
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV].
3. Rousseau's position became almost axiomatic in the centuries following the publication of The Social Contract in 1762. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT

SOCIAL (Ronald Grimsley ed., 1972) (1762); infra note 18 and accompanying text.
4. Consider, for example, recent fighting between Hizbullah and Israel, and the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Turkey. See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, 3 Die and Scores
Are Hurt in Bomb Attacks in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at A10; Steven Erlanger,
The Long-Term Battle: Defining 'Victory' Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at
A10.
5. Private military companies are another example of the privatization of the use of
force.

See generally PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE

PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2004); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How
Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46
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civilians and combatants are clearly distinct groups. Finally, much of
international humanitarian law rests on the belief that states act on the
basis of reciprocity-a notion that is seriously challenged by the rise of
non-state actors.
This Article offers a few (and preliminary) suggestions on how to approach the more fundamental question of the applicability of the laws
governing the use of force (before and during war) to non-state actors, in
particular to transnational terrorist organizations. I will suggest that
although the above-mentioned assumptions may at times stand in the way
of a straightforward application of these laws to transnational terrorist
organizations, the principles underlying enactments such as the Geneva
Conventions can be helpful in responding to the legal challenges raised
by contemporary terrorism.
In considering the applicability of international law to non-state actors,
this Article will examine limited areas of both the jus ad bellum and the
jus in bello. With respect to the jus ad bellum, Part I suggests how Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter may be applied to transnational terrorist organizations. With respect to the jus in bello, Part II focuses on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions (and accompanying
Protocols) to conflicts involving non-state actors.
I. Jus AD BELLUM: THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 2(4) AND 51 TO
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Articles 2 and 51 of the UN Charter provide for severe limitations on
states' recourse to force. While the former enjoins states from using
force,8 the latter provides for an exception only in cases of self-defense. 9
The narrow question considered in this Article is whether these limitations on the use of force apply equally to non-states.

B.C. L. REV. 989, 996-97 (2005). As such, these entities pose another challenge to the
traditional laws of war and further cast a shadow on the age-old "state vs. state" principle.
6. Private military companies, whose employees behave like soldiers, wear uniforms
and carry arms, also illustrate the weakness of the traditional groupings. See Minow, supra
note 5, at 996-97; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It Is Time for Intermediate
Levels of Recognitionfor PartialCompliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209, 211-12 (2005).
7. For the purposes of this Article, "transnational terrorist organizations" refers to
non-state entities that deliberately harm civilians and spread terror among them through
the use of indiscriminate warfare, operate beyond the territorial delimitation of a single
state, and draw on international resources for financing, recruiting, or other type of support. They must be distinguished from domestic entities that may also resort to such tactics but fall under the criminal jurisdiction of individual states (such as ETA or the IRA).
8. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
9. Id. art. 51.
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A. Article 2(4): The General ProhibitionAgainst the Use of Force in
InternationalRelations
Article 2(4) embodies what might be described as the foundation principle of the Charter-interstate disputes must be solved peacefully:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.' °
The wording is remarkably straightforward, and the purpose clear. But
beyond the restriction on force, Article 2(4) reveals a historical and strategic worldview that states wage war against other states-that international relations are defined by interstate relationships.
The understanding that force is legitimate only when expressly authorized by the sovereign can be traced back to the time when pirates and
corsairs navigated the seas in search of merchant ships belonging to enemy nations (or, in some cases, even their own country of origin). Unlike
pirates, corsairs (also called privateers) used to operate on the basis of a
commission or letter of marque granted by a sovereign.1 This letter gave
them the right to use force against ships with the express and recognized
authorization of the sovereign, and was meant to provide the corsairs
with immunity against charges of piracy." The letter of marque, in effect,
conferred quasi-official status to these private individuals, who were
treated as prisoners of war when captured. 3 Without it, one was a mere
bandit or pirate without any protection. 4
In the sixteenth century, Francisco de Vitoria, a Spanish Dominican
priest and philosopher, further shaped the contour of the state's sole authority to wage war. In particular, Vitoria set forth the limits on a private
individual's authority to make war:
[T]he difference herein between a private person and a State is
that a private person is entitled ... to defend himself and what
belongs to him, but has no right to avenge a wrong done to him,
nay, not even to recapt [sic] property seized from him if time has
been allowed to go by since the seizure.... [W]hen the necessity
of defense has passed there is an end to the lawfulness of war....
10. Id. art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
11. J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465, 468
(2005).
12. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Ely, Black, Grotius & Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv. 81, 86
(1995).
13. See id.
14. It was only in 1856, with the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, that privateering
was abolished. See Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (Declaration of Paris), Apr. 16,
1856, reprinted in 2 COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES

OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1473, 1474 (Francis Dedk & Phillip C. Jessup eds., 1939).
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But a State is within its rights not only in defending itself, but also
in avenging itself and its subjects and in redressing wrongs.
The authority to declare offensive or preemptive war-as opposed to
defensive war-therefore rests solely with the state:
Such a State, then, or the prince thereof, has authority to declare
war, and no one else. 6
In the same spirit, Hugo Grotius established a distinction between public wars, waged by a sovereign, and private wars, waged by private individuals, and thus unlawful. 7 But it is Rousseau who, in the eighteenth
century, consecrated in unambiguous terms the principle that war is
waged between states, not men:
War is thus not a relationship between men, but a relationship
between states, in which private individuals are only enemies accidentally, neither as men nor as citizens, but as soldiers ....
18
Each state can only have as enemies other states not men.
Since Rousseau, the principle that war is waged among states has prevailed and has continuously been viewed as one of the tenets of traditional international law.' 9 Private force, then as now, is cloaked with the
suspicion of illegitimacy. 0
15.

FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES

(Ernest

Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., 1917) (1532), reprinted in 7 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 163, 168 (James Brown Scott ed., 1917).

16.

Id. at 169.

1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 384 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
18. ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at 110-11 (translation provided by author).
19. See, e.g., PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
964 (7th ed. 2002); 2 PAUL GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
315 (1954); 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948)
("To be war, the contention must be between States. In the Middle Ages wars between
private individuals, so-called private wars were known .... But such wars have totally
disappeared in modern times. A contention may, of course, arise between the armed
forces of a State and a body of armed individuals, but this is not war."); CHARLES
ROUSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES 3 (1983); see also Dan Belz, Is International
Humanitarian Law Lapsing Into Irrelevance in the War on International Terror?, 7
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 97, 114 (2006) ("The main limitation is that the laws of
war were formulated to regulate the conduct of states, and they prove less applicable when
one of the belligerent parties is a non-state actor."). The principle resonates beyond the
laws of war: the Westphalian system, born in 1648, is also based on the understanding that
states are the main, if not only, players on the international arena and have the monopoly
on the use of force. See generally Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post-WestphalianLegal Order,23 QLR 23 (2004).
20. In 2002, the UK issued a green paper dealing with the issue of the privatization of
the use of force in the hands of private military companies (PMCs). See FOREIGN &
17.

COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE,

PRIVATE

MILITARY

COMPANIES:

OPTIONS

FOR

REGULATION (2002), http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf. According to
this study, part of the reason why the use of PMCs is so challenging to international law is
that "the monopoly on violence remains essential to our notion of a State." Id. para. 39.
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Returning to Article 2(4), the state-centric worldview of its drafters is
unmistakable. The Article is silent on the right of states to use force
against transnational terrorist organizations or other non-state threats to
international security. 2' This silence might also be attributed to the fact
that, at the time of the adoption of the UN Charter, those types of threats
were not commonplace. Prior to the development of modern technology
and weaponry, which greatly enhanced the destructive capacity of the
individual militant, non-state actors probably caused internal disturbances more than real threats. Bands of armed attackers from neighboring states-unless organized and equipped by a national governmentwere a local problem, not a strategic threat.2
Had the drafters known at the time that non-state entities might be as
threatening as states, they probably would have condemned recourse to
force by and against non-state entities, since the purpose of the laws of
war is to protect citizens when force is being used and the purpose of the
law of nations is to eliminate force from international relations. It thus
seems fair to say that, had the threat been envisaged by the Charter's
drafters, the use of force by and against non-state entities would not only
have been addressed but also condemned. In other words, in spite of the
clarity of its wording, Article 2(4) should be interpreted as encompassing
non-state entities as well.
This interpretation is supported by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 3 Article 31 provides that "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in ... accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."24 Even though the "ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms" of Article 2(4) is unambiguous, the prohibition set forth in
this Article should extend to transnational terrorist organizations. This
This is a point often raised in connection with PMCs since they, too, demonstrate the limits
of the traditional assumptions. See Thomas K. Adams, The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, PARAMETERS, Summer 1999, at 103, 105 ("[T]he UN is an organization of states, and states have always jealously guarded their monopoly on the use of force,
especially deadly force. This monopoly has emphatically included the right to create and
employ military forces.").
21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
22. Nationalist insurgencies are an obvious exception. The Austro-Hungarian empire,
for example, was beset by numerous-and continual-nationalist revolts (notably among
the Czech, Hungarian, and Balkan populations). Ultimately, however, its dismemberment
came at the hands of World War I's Allied Powers. It should also be mentioned that the
major nationalist challenges to the Austro-Hungarian empire (as with other empires in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century) were internal, not external. See generally ROBERT A.
KANN, A HISTORY OF THE HABSBURG EMPIRE 1526-1918 (1974).

23.
1969, S.
24.
25.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23,
ExEc. Doc. L, 92-1 (1970), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. art. 31.
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follows from the declared object and purpose of the United Nations
Charter, namely, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war," "to ensure... that armed force shall not be used," and "to maintain
international peace and security through "the removal of threats to the
peace., 27 The purpose of Article 2(4) being to prohibit all types of recourse of force, it should be interpreted as covering the use of force by
and against non-states.
B. Article 51: Response to an Armed Attack Emanatingfrom a Non-state
Article 51 complements Article 2(4) by providing the necessary exception to the prohibition against the use of force:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
againsta Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. 8
Article 51 speaks of attacks against member states but does not specify
the identity of the attacker. 29 An interpretation requiring an attack by a
state would not, in my view, be warranted -neither by the plain meaning
of Article 51, nor in the light of the object and purpose of the UN Charter.
First, adding a condition pertaining to the identity of the attacker
would not be warranted by the plain meaning of Article 51. The right of
self-defense, as framed by the Article, is not defined as contingent upon
an armed attack by a state -as the use of the vague wording "if an armed
attack occurs" demonstrates. In fact, the language of Article 51 initially
incorporated the words armed "attack by another state," but this wording
was later dropped.3 ° Whether or not the drafters dropped the words "by
another state" in order to allow self-defense against non-states is beside
the point. What matters is that no state objected to the fact that the new
language would not prohibit self-defense in response to armed attacks by
non-states.31
26. U.N. Charter pmbl.
27. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
28. Id. art. 51 (emphasis added).
29. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1079 (declaration of Buergenthal,
J.); Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 58 (2005).
30. Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse
Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62,70 (2005) (citing Timothy Kearley, Regulation of
Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United Nations Charter:A Search for OriginalIntent, 3 Wyo. L. REv. 663, 693, 695-97, 699-700 (2003)).
31. Id.
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In addition, if Article 2(4) sets forth a general prohibition against the
use of force, its corollary, too, should apply across the board. Articles
2(4) and 51 should mirror each other -they should both be interpreted as
applying to states and non-states equally. If they do not, Article 51 could
be interpreted as giving non-states a blank check to use force without fear
of (lawful) retaliation -definitely not the intended purpose of Article 51.
Secondly, and most importantly, a broad reading of Article 51 would sit
well with the overall object and purpose of the UN Charter, which was to
prevent and condemn all forms of international violence.32 In Resolution
1368, the Security Council recently endorsed a broad interpretation of
Article 51, recognized "the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence in accordance with the Charter" in the context of international
terrorism, and legitimized the United States' response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001. 3" In a later resolution, the Council went even further
by adopting measures to combat international terrorism under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, and confirmed the view that international terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 34 Although
these resolutions do not explicitly cite Article 51, they implicitly acknowledge that a state may claim self-defense in response to an armed
attack by a terrorist organization. That the United States was entitled to
rely on the exception of self-defense when responding to the 9/11 attacks
was also the view taken by NATO."
Notwithstanding, less than three years later, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) took the opposite stance, namely, that an "armed attack"
within the meaning of Article 51 can only emanate from a state. In its
advisory opinion, Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), the ICJ declared the following:
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one
32. See Emanuel Gross, Combating Terrorism:Does Self-Defence Include the Security
Barrier? The Answer Depends on Who You Ask, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 576 (2005).
33. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
34. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28,2001).
35. Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement by the North Atlantic Council
(Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm ("The commitment to
collective self-defence embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less
essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism."). For a discussion on NATO's reliance upon Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, see Sophie Clavier,
ContrastingPerspectives on Preemptive Strike: The United States, France, and the War on
Terror,58 ME. L. REV. 565,575 (2006); Murphy, supranote 30, at 67; Jordan J.Paust, Post9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of
Persons, Treatment, JudicialReview of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1344 (2004) (stating that both the Security Council
and NATO recognized the right of self-defense against non-state actors).
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State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that
the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State....
*.. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by
Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and
therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in
support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has
no relevance in this case.36
Thus, in the middle of the "war on terror," the ICJ took the position that
Article 51 applies only to armed attacks by states.
The Advisory Opinion's take on Article 51's inapplicability to nonstate actors challenges the view taken just a few years earlier by the Security Council.3" As mentioned above, it is also unwarranted by the plain
meaning of Article 51, which places the emphasis on the extent of the
damage caused by the attack (i.e., that the attack rises to the level of an
"armed attack"), rather than on the identity of the attacker.
On a practical level, by ruling out the right of states to rely on selfdefense to protect themselves against international terrorism, the ICJ
leaves us wondering what tools remain at the disposal of states to respond
to force used by such entities. Given the broad language of Article 51

36. Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1050 (emphasis added).
37. The Advisory Opinion was not the ICJ's first opportunity to consider the matter.
In its 1986 Nicaraguav. United States decision, the court noted that armed attacks by nonstate actors could, in principle, trigger a right of self-defense-provided that the non-state
conduct could be attributed to a state. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27). For a discussion of the Nicaragua case with regard to
self-defense and non-states, see Kathleen Rende Cronin-Furman, The International Court
of Justice and the United Nations Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 435, 450 (2006); Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of Self-Defence in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 963, 940-71 (2005).
Note that the restrictive reading of self-defense in Nicaraguais also reflected in the more
recent decision of the Oil Platforms. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Nov. 6, 2003), 42
I.L.M. 1334, 1354-57.
38. See Cronin-Furman, supra note 37, at 448 (arguing that the Advisory Opinion
contradicts the Security Council, and further discussing the problematic implications for
the United Nations system); see also Oil Platforms, 42 I.L.M. at 1398 (Kooijmans, J., separate opinion) (criticizing the court for bypassing the Security Council, and considering that
the Security Council's novel interpretation was warranted); id. at 1385 (Higgins, J., separate opinion); id. at 1406 (Buergenthal, J., separate opinion).
39. lain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me- "In Defense of the International Court," 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 80-81 (2005).
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and the ever-increasing use of violence •on the •part41 of non-states,4 0° it is
surprising that the ICJ chose such an interpretation.
Why, then, did the ICJ take the view that an "armed attack" in the
meaning of Article 51 can only emanate from a state? 42 It is difficult to
answer this question given the succinctness of the ICJ's argument on this
point. 43 Did the court worry that extending Article 51 to armed attacks
emanating from non-states would open the door to claims of self-defense
in a broader range of circumstances (including in cases of internal insur-44
gencies)? Did the court overlook the wider implications of its position?
40. Michla Pomerance, The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdictionand the Crumbling Wall Between the Politicaland the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 26 (2005).
41. Cronin-Furman, supra note 37, at 452 ("[T]he ICJ has applied a definition of selfdefense that does not comport with the one under which the international political arena
has been functioning.... [T]he Court's view fails to take account of current political realities.").
42. To venture in the realm of speculation, the solution adopted by the ICJ in the
Advisory Opinion might perhaps be traced back to an article written in 2004 by Gilbert
Guillaume, judge and former president of the court at the time of the decision. See generally Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537
(2004). In Terrorism and InternationalLaw, Judge Guillaume gives much weight to "those
...authors" who consider that an armed attack in the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter
"ha[s] to be attributed not only to private individuals liable to criminal prosecution, but
further to a State which exercises effective control over those individuals." Id. at 546.
After exposing-without expressly rejecting it, as is expected from a member of the
court-the argument that self-defense against a non-state actor is justified based on the
United States' reliance on self-defense and the endorsement by NATO, Judge Guillaume
notes:
Certain doubts have been expressed, however, as to the validity of this argument.
It has thus been emphasized that it would be dubious to derive an instantaneous custom from one isolated precedent. It has further been observed that this evolution
would amount to such a radical change in international law that it would require a
clearer practice and a more constant opiniojuris.
Id. at 54647. The apparent caution with which these words were written does not prevent
the reader from getting the impression that the author seems rather opposed to a broad
interpretation of Article 51.
43. Cronin-Furman, supra note 37, at 453 ("[Tlhe Court's credibility and efficacy in
the exercise of advisory opinion jurisdiction depend entirely on whether states view it as
correctly interpreting the law. Dissonance with the Security Council-especially in its role
as weathervane of state practice-could threaten its credibility." (footnote omitted));
Pomerance, supra note 40, at 36; Scobbie, supra note 39, at 80; Tams, supra note 37, at 974
(arguing that the telegraphic nature of the court's statement "weighs negatively on its
authority"). The court's "telegraphic style" is reminiscent of the judicial decisions of the
continental legal systems, where even the highest courts' judgments are very succinct and
provide little in terms of legal reasoning. Here, the court-deliberately or not-adopted
an approach that resembles more the civil tradition than the common law tradition. It is
worth noting given the general tendency of the international legal system to evolve in the
direction of the common law tradition.
44. Robert A. Caplen, Mending the "Fence": How Treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict by the International Court of Justice at the Hague Has Redefined the Doctrine of
Self-Defense, 57 FLA. L. REV. 717, 762 (2005) (arguing that the court's interpretation of
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It is hard to believe that the ICJ would not give the issue the attention it
deserves.45 In fact, ignoring the argument altogether might have been a
better solution-and would not have constituted such a blunt refutation
of the 2001 Security Council resolutions.4 Perhaps the reason is to be
found in the rather competitive relationship between the two United Nations bodies.47
The ICJ's restrictive interpretation was greeted with criticism by many
scholars, most of whom view Article 51 as allowing states to act in selfdefense in response to any armed attack, regardless of the identity of the
attacker.48 Some even argue that this interpretation is inconsistent with
state practice.49 Whether the restrictive interpretation will withstand the
Article 51 "establishes a dangerous precedent in an era of global terrorism"); CroninFurman, supra note 37, at 452-53.
45. In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ made a point of addressing the issue of selfdefense even though the case at hand did not necessarily call for a finding on this point,
thus showing how much importance the court gives to the issue. Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.) (Nov. 6, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1354-57; supra note 38.
46. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall
in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory: Opinion and Reaction, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 119, 126 (2006) ("It seems that by this approach of limiting the right to self-defence to
the attacks originating from states, the court avoided some elevation of the further issue of
whether, provided that there had been an armed attack justifying the action in selfdefence, the action such as the construction of the Wall with far-reaching implications on
[the] civilian population could meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality...
."). Israel had relied on the Security Council resolutions in its submission to the court. See
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enhancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War on
Terror?,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 450-51 (2005).
47. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 318-19 (4th ed.
2005); Cronin-Furman, supra note 37, at 436-48, 452-53.
48. E.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 47, at 204; Caplen, supra note 44, at 757; Clavier, supra
note 35, at 572; Gross, supra note 32, at 570, 575; Murphy, supra note 30, at 62 (criticizing
the court for holding that self-defense cannot be claimed in response to attacks by nonstate actors); Paust, supra note 35, at 1340 ("Armed attacks by nonstate, nonnation, nonbelligerent, noninsurgent actors like bin Laden and members of al Qaeda can trigger the
right of selective and proportionate self-defense under the U.N. Charter against those
directly involved in processes of armed attack .... ); Tams, supra note 37, at 973; Wedgwood, supra note 29, at 57 (arguing that the Charter's language does not link the right of
self-defense to the particular legal personality of the attacker). By contrast, rare are those
who have defended the court's treatment of Article 51 in the Advisory Opinion. See, e.g.,
Pieter H.F. Bekker, The World Court's Ruling Regarding Israel's West Bank Barrier and
the Primacy of International Law: An Insider's Perspective, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 553,
563-64 (2005); Orakhelashvili, supra note 46, at 125-26; Scobbie, supra note 39, at 76-77.
49. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also DisruptingSome Crucial Legal Categories
of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 996-97 (2001); see also Murphy, supra note
30, at 67, 69 (arguing that state practice "support[s] the permissibility of responding in selfdefense to an attack by a non-state actor," and citing various incidents involving the reliance of the United States, Israel, South Africa, Senegal, Thailand, and Tajikistan on selfdefense in justification for forceful measures taken against non-state actors-terrorists or
insurgents-operating in foreign states); Tams, supra note 37, at 972; DINSTEIN, supra note
47, at 184-85 (arguing that the Carolineincident of 1837-which served, and continues to
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test of time is difficult to predict. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that
the United Nations itself is moving away from a restrictive interpretation
of Article 51. The Security Council resolutions of 2001, as well as a later
United Nations report encouraging the organization to "achieve the same
degree of normative strength concerning non-State use of force as it has
concerning State use of force, 50 and recent opinions of ICJ judges, are all
characteristic of a change toward an interpretation inclusive of non-state
actors. 51
II. JUS IN BELLO: THE LEGAL STATUS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE LAWS OF WAR

The laws of war today are enshrined, for the most part, in the Geneva
Conventions, which were conceived in the wake of World War II in order
to establish limitations on the way states wage war and treat each other's
citizens in wartime. A generation later, in the aftermath of the Vietnam
War and at the height of the wars-by-proxy of the cold war era, they were
supplemented by the adoption of Additional Protocols I and II (the Protocols) .52
The laws of war-also referred to as international humanitarian law
(IHL) - rest on three key assumptions: that the authority to wage war
rests solely with states;53 that combatants and civilians are easily distinguishable; and that states operate on the basis of reciprocity.- Because
the Conventions rest on these somewhat outdated assumptions, they fail
serve, as the example epitomizing a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense-related to
an attack by non-state actors. Britain argued that it was entitled to act in self-defense
against the Caroline because the schooner had been used by rebels who were fighting
British control over Canada).
50. U.N. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, A More Secure World:
Our SharedResponsibility, 159, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
51. Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Dec.
19, 2005), 45 I.L.M. 271, 357-58 (Kooijmans, J., separate opinion); id. at 370 (Simma, J.,
separate opinion).
52. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
53. While the assumption that the authority to wage war rests primarily, if not solely,
with states is discussed at length in section 1, this section will focus on the principle of
distinction and the assumption that states operate on the basis of reciprocity.
54. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 675, 706 (2004) ("[T]he
Hague and Geneva Conventions presuppose a clear distinction between front lines and
battlefields, on the one hand, and civilian areas, on the other; and a correspondingly clear
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Once again, this hearkens back to an
imagined past in which wars were fought by professional soldiers in elaborate uniforms,
clashing on the vast, open fields to the sound of bugles and drums.").
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to provide a complete and satisfactory answer to the issues raised by
global terror.5 In addition, two key principles of international humanitarian law-which derive from the above mentioned assumptionsfurther complicate the determination of a legal regime for transnational
terrorists under IHL. In the face of such inadequacy, this Article will
suggest additional analytical tools that may be used to determine where
these entities (should) fit within the laws of war.
A. The Legal Status of TransnationalTerrorism Under the Laws of War
Notwithstanding their limitations, the Geneva Conventions must be the
starting point for any inquiry into the legal status of terrorist organizations.56 Under the Conventions, the process of classification begins with
the determination of the nature of an armed conflict (internal or international),5 as distinct consequences follow from the categorization of a conflict.,,
55. The failure of the Conventions to address non-state entities can be attributed to
the reality on the ground at the time of their adoption. However, the same cannot be said
about the Protocols, which constitute more contemporary expressions of these laws and
were formulated in the midst of Soviet and United States-backed guerilla campaigns. See
Avril McDonald, The Challenges to InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the Principles of
Distinctionand Protectionfrom the Increased Participationin Hostilities 1 (Univ. of Teheran & Harvard Univ. Humanitarian Law Research Initiative on the Interplay Between
Int'l Humanitarian Law & Int'l Human Rights Law, Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://wihl.nl/documents/cms ihl_680_1_Direct%2OParticipation%20in%20hostilities.doc
("[While the] assumption that war fighting is the work and privilege of soldiers and that
civilians are generally to be considered as protected persons ... may have reflected the
actuality of armed conflict prior to the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949, it
was already becoming divorced from reality by the time of the adoption of the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977 and today increasingly seems a quaint and
archaic notion, out of step with the reality of today's wars."). On the archaic character of
these principles, see, for example, A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 12 (2d ed.
2004) (proposing to shift the distinction to military objectives versus civilian objects);
Brooks, supra note 54, at 755-56.
56. When referring to the Conventions, I include the Additional Protocols.
57. Although "armed conflict" is not defined in the Geneva Conventions, the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia held that there is an armed conflict
"whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Oct. 2, 1999).
58. "Combatancy," for example, which is not defined under the Conventions, is a
concept inherent to international armed conflict; it does not appear in Protocol II dealing
with internal armed conflict. See Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September
11: History Revisited and Law Revised, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS
OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 75, 91-92 David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista
eds., 2005) ("[T]he law applicable to non-international armed conflicts does not provide
for combatant status, nor does it define combatants or specify a series of obligations inherent in combatant status .... This striking silence in the law applicable to non-international
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The analysis below demonstrates that conflicts involving transnational
terrorist networks do not fall neatly into either the international or internal armed conflict categories, causing further difficulty in the determination of a terrorist's status under IHL. This section will show that, whatever the characterization of a conflict, transnational terrorist organizations-or any militants, for that matter-cannot be considered civilians
because of the type of activities in which they engage. This argument is
supported by a historical study of the logic and purposes underlying the
civilian/combatant distinction, and by a morality-based assessment of
noncombatant immunity.
1. The Distinction Between Internationaland InternalArmed Conflict
International armed conflict is broadly defined in Common Article 2
and in Article 1(4) of Protocol I to include several specifically enumerated types of conflict. 9 According to the definition, two types of international armed conflict may involve non-state entities: fights against occupation and fights for self-determination. 60 Conflicts involving transnational terrorist groups may fall in either category, or none at all. For example, only in limited instances do transnational terrorist organizations
operate on occupied territory-al Qaeda in Iraq61 is one such example. A
larger number of transnational terrorist organizations are involved in
struggles for self-determination 62 (for example, the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP)). Other transnational terrorist networks do not aspire to selfarmed conflicts means that any effort to describe a 'combatant engaged in a noninternational armed conflict' is an oxymoron.").
59. Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 1(4); Geneva Convention III, supra note 2, art. 2.
Protocol I applies to international armed conflict defined as (i) a conflict between two or
more State parties to the treaty; (ii) cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
party to the treaty (common Article 2); and (iii)
"armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination." Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 1(4). In addition, as per Article 1(3) of Protocol I, the applicability of the Protocol (and thus the qualification of international armed conflict) is extended to all situations referred to in Common Article 2 of the Conventions, thereby considerably broadening the meaning of "international armed conflict" for those states that have ratified Protocol I (to include occupation and wars of national liberation). Id. art. 1(3).
60. See Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 1(4). Because the definition includes wars of
national liberation and struggles for self-determination, a number of countries, including
the United States, did not ratify the Protocol.
61. This group is also known as al Qaeda Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, or
Monotheism and Holy War.
62. See G.A. Res. 3103,
3, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9412 (Dec. 12,
1973) ("[A]rmed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the
sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions ...").
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determination or fight against occupation specifically; their objective is to
undermine or destroy certain governments or States (these tend to include "ideological" terrorist groups such as worldwide al Qaeda but may
also include "mixed bags" such as the religious/nationalist/political Hizbullah, depending on one's reading of the organization). In sum, conflicts
involving transnational terrorists do not fall neatly into the rather• techni61
cal and formalistic categories set forth by the Geneva Conventions.
The definition of internal armed conflict, too, is problematic. Article
1(1) of Protocol II of the Geneva Convention governs non-international
armed conflict, defined negatively as an armed conflict (1) not covered by
Article I of Protocol I, and (2) "tak[ing] place in the territory of a [state]
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control
over a part of [a state's] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations.64
Two provisions considerably restrict the scope of Article 1(1)'s definition of internal armed conflict. First, Article 1(2) provides that the Protocol does not apply to "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,6
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature," 1

63. For further examples of conflicts considered international armed conflicts, see
Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to Al Qaeda,56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759 (2007) (arguing that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been international armed conflicts that
trigger the application of the customary laws of war); Marco Sassoli, La "guerre contre le
terrorisme," le droit internationalhumanitaireet le statut de prisonnierde guerre (The "War
Against Terror," InternationalHumanitarian Law and the Status of Prisoner of War), 34
ANNUAIRE CANADIEN DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 211, 215, 225 (2001) (arguing that,
unlike the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States' response in Afghanistan can be
considered international armed conflict); John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International
Armed Conflict, and Their Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings, INSIGHTS
(Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh81.htm
(noting that the author's analysis "proceed[ed] on the assumption that the law of international armed conflict applied as between the United States and the Taleban and AlQaeda" at least as of October 7, 2001); see also Brooks, supra note 54, at 759 (arguing that
a new law of armed conflict "would have to resort to standards rather than rules.").
64. Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1(1) (emphasis added). It must be noted that the
Statute of the International Criminal Court defines non-international armed conflicts
slightly differently, as "armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there
is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The ICC's definition is
broader than the Additional Protocol's insofar as it does not require exercise of control
over territory. The ICC's definition is thus more likely to apply to acts committed by
transnational terror networks in internal armed conflicts since they, unlike rebel groups,
often do not exercise control over territory. In addition, it provides for situations of conflicts "between such groups" meaning that state participation in the hostilities is not required, unlike in the Protocol's definition. Id.
65. Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 1(2).
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which often characterize terrorist acts.66 Second, as mentioned above,
wars of national liberation are considered international armed conflict
under Article 1(4) of Protocol I, and are therefore excluded from the
scope of Protocol 11.67 Because these two provisions considerably restrict
the applicability of Protocol II, only a small number of conflicts involving
transnational terrorists qualify as internal armed conflict.
The result is a somewhat arbitrary regime. Lebanon's Hizbullah, for
example, once claimed to fight against Israeli occupation (and still so
claims in spite of Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000),
bringing the fighting into the sphere of international armed conflict.6 Its
objectives in the war with Israel in the summer of 2006 were less clear,
and the conflict's proper characterization is uncertain. One would be
hard pressed to argue that it was either a war against occupation or a war
of liberation; at the same time, it hardly resembled an internal armed
conflict. Were the organization/party/militia to fight against other Lebanese factions or the Lebanese government in the future, the conflict
would likely be characterized as internal armed conflict. But if Israel
were to seize Lebanese territory as part of the conflagration, and Hizbullah responded in defense of itself and the State of Lebanon, the conflict's
character would be open to question.
The main difficulty thus lies in predicting when a conflict involving
non-state entities will qualify as internalarmed conflict.69 In Nicaraguav.
United States, the International Court of Justice viewed the crimes committed by the contras in Nicaragua through the prism of internal armed
conflict. 70 By contrast, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held that the acts committed by Bosnian Serbs should be
judged according to the rules of international armed conflict on the
ground that Bosnian Serbs were under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.71 As for the U.S. Supreme Court, it held that Common
Article 3 applies to the treatment of a Yemeni national, allegedly affiliated with al Qaeda, captured in Afghanistan, thus equating the war in

66. In addition to the untenable internal/international distinction, there is the oftencited problem of determining when a conflict has risen from the level of "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence," see Rome Statute, supra note 64, art. 8(2)(f), to an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Protocol
II.
67. Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 1(4).
68. Q & A: Leaving Lebanon, BBC NEWS, May 23, 2000, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middleeast/636594.stm.
69. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 714-15.
70. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 114 (June 27).
80, 86-87, 91 (July 15,
71. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
1999).
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Afghanistan with an internal armed conflict 2 although it has also been
viewed at times as an international armed conflict.73
As the examples show, distinctions between internal and international
armed conflicts seem rather artificial in practice. 74 For the limited pur
poses of this Article, however, the fact that both Protocols prohibit
"[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population," suggests that terrorism is contemplated (and outlawed) in both types of armed conflict.75
2. The Inadequacy of the Civilian/CombatantDistinction
Long before the adoption of the Conventions, the distinction between
combatants and noncombatants had already found expressions in legal
(and non-legal) instruments. A number of ancient legal codes required
that belligerents exercise care not to kill civilians. Although each ancient
civilization expressed this requirement slightly differently, the overarching idea remained the same. The Old Testament was one of the first
"moral" codes to enjoin fighters to spare women and children.76 In 634
AD, the Muslim Arab Army invading Christian Syria was urged not to
mutilate or kill a child, man, or woman.77 The Chinese civilization, with78
Sun Tzu, established a distinction between "soldiers" and "people.,
Around 1500 BC, Hinduism prohibited the killing of "one who is naked,
...one who is disarmed, [or] one who looks on without taking part in the
fight., 79 The Hellenes knew "'that the guilt of war is always confined to a
72. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-96 (2006) (adopting the "residual"
view that whatever is not an international armed conflict should be considered internal
armed conflict).
73. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 54, at 713-14.
74. James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of InternationalizedArmed Conflict, 85 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 313, 314 (2003) (suggesting to abolish the distinction between internal and international armed conflict).
75. Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 51(2); Protocol II, supra note 52, art. 13(2). Note
that Article 4(2)(d) of Protocol II explicitly prohibits "[a]cts of terrorism." Protocol II,
supra note 52, art. 4(2)(d); see also Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, "Terrorism" and
InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 547, 561-62 (2002).
76. Deuteronomy 20:14; see also JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8 (1985).
77. Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under
Customary InternationalLaw and Under ProtocolI, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 118
(1986) (citing MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955)).

78. See generally SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (4th century BC).
79. Laws of Manu ch. VII, arts. 90-93, available at http://www.sacredtexts.com/hin/manu.htm (George Biihler trans.) ("When he fights with his foes in battle, let
him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned,
or the points of which are blazing with fire ....

Let him not strike one who (in flight) has

climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says 'I
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few persons and that the many are their friends"' and were not to assume
that "'the whole population
of a city-men, women, and children-are
' ' 8°
equally their enemies.

The principle of distinction began to truly formalize around the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in particular with Francisco de Vitoria,
who established that innocent people cannot be killed. 1 In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius further laid down the rule that women and
children ought to be spared in war. 82 Early in the eighteenth century, the
sentiment began to take hold that certain categories of persons are innocent and ought to be protected.83
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was among the first 84 to provide a modern formulation of the distinction between the soldier who carries his weapon,
on one hand, and the "man" who has laid it down, on the other:
Since the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy State, it is legitimate to kill the latter's defenders as long as they are carrying
arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, they
cease to be enemies or agents of the enemy, and again become
mere men, and it is no longer legitimate to take their lives.
Then, in 1863, came the first truly legal expression of the distinction between civilians and combatants-the Lieber Code, a pamphlet drafted by
the jurist Francis Lieber at the request of General Henry Wager Halleck,6
General-in-Chief of the Union Armies during the American Civil War.
am thine' ....Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is
naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor
one who is fighting with another (foe) .... Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one
afflicted (with sorrow), nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear,
nor one who has turned to flight; (but in all these cases let him) remember the duty (of
honourable warriors)." (emphasis added)). Manu is the equivalent of Adam in Hinduism.
80. 1 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR 5 (1972) (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
(360 BC)).
81. VITORIA, supra note 15, at 171 ("we may not turn our sword against those who do
us no harm, the killing of innocent being forbidden by natural law.").
82. 3 GROTIUS, supra note 17, at 1439-45 (stating that males who do not bear arms
also ought to be spared).
83. Christian penitential canons punished the slaughter of a monk or a cleric more
severely than that of a layman. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 8 (citing the "Penitential of
the Venerable Bede" dating from the early eighth century); see also ROGERS, supra note
55, at 8-9 ("By at least the eighteenth century, the rule had emerged that non-combatants
should not be directly attacked." (citations omitted)).
84. PICTET, supra note 76, at 23 ("Rousseau thus gained the signal honour of having
stated, clearly and for all time, the fundamental rule of the modem law of war.").
85. ROUSSEAU, supra note 3, at 111 (translation provided by author).
86. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Apr.
24, 1863, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfFULll10?OpenDocument [hereinafter
Lieber Code]. Dr. Lieber was an international legal scholar and professor at Columbia
University. Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under
InternationalLaw: An Analysis of the U.S. PredatorStrike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
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Lieber wrote that soldiers should distinguish between "the private individual belonging to a hostile country" and "the unarmed citizen," who "is
to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of
the war will admit." The Lieber Code also emphasized that the "inoffensive individual" cannot be murdered and should be granted protection.8 The Code provides:
The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to
be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and
protection, and every disruption of family ties. Protection was,
and is still is with uncivilized people, the exception. 89
In this excerpt, Lieber stresses what he knew was a novel idea -that civilized people ought to protect "inoffensive citizen[s]" in time of war. 90 For
example, the Code provides that noncombatants, "especially the women
and children," may be removed before the start of a bombardment. 9'
However, "[s]o soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and
takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses." 9 The
distinction between permitted and forbidden killing could not have been
spelled out more clearly to General Halleck, who had commissioned the
Code precisely because he was confused about who could be considered
an "ordinary belligerent," and worried about the consequences of capture for his own men. 93 Lieber's answer was definite: "[A]I enemies in
regular war are divided into two general classes -that is to say, into com-

FOREIGN AFF. 331, 362 n.170 (2003). See generally R.R. Baxter, The First Modern Codification of the Law of War, 3 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 171,177 (1963); Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber's Code and Principlesof Humanity, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269 (1998);
Jordan J. Paust, Dr. FrancisLieber and the Lieber Code, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 112,

112-14 (2001).
87. Lieber Code, supra note 86, art. 22.
88. Id. art. 23.
89. Id. art. 24.
90. Id. art. 25.
91. Id. art. 19.
92. Id. art. 57.
93. General Halleck's request referred to the right of rebels "to send men, in the garb
of peaceful citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges and houses and to
destroy property and persons within our lines." Letter from Henry Wager Halleck, General-in-Chief of Union Armies, to Francis Lieber (Aug. 6, 1862), in RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2 (1983). The rebels demanded that

"such persons be treated as ordinary belligerents, and that when captured," they be treated
as prisoners of war, otherwise the rebels would "retaliate by executing [the] prisoners of
war in their possession." Id.
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batants and noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government." 94
By formulating the distinction in such unambiguous terms, the Lieber
Code helped build the foundations of today's laws of war.95 It directly
influenced a conference convened in St. Petersburg in 1868, the first of a
series of international conferences dedicated to the codification of the
laws of war.96 Six years later, the delegates of fifteen European states met
in Brussels at the Russian Czar's initiative in order to regulate the use of
chemical weapons. The resulting Brussels Declaration is a remarkably
progressive statement for the time, providing, among other things, for
"[w]ho should be recognized as belligerents, combatants and noncombatants" as well as guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war
and the sick and wounded.99 In word and spirit, the Declaration echoes
Lieber's distinction between participants and non-participants in hostilities.
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the principle of distinction had become embedded in the corpus of the laws of war. 99 Surprisingly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not deal in depth with the
question of the protection of the civilian population.0 It was only in
94. Lieber Code, supra note 86, art. 155; see also Meron, supra note 86, at 274 (arguing that the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is one of the main themes
developed in the code).
95. Printer, supra note 86, at 363; see also Meron, supra note 86, at 279 (noting Lieber's uncontested influence).
96. See Newton, supra note 58, at 77-78. The conference adopted the St. Petersburg
Declaration. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 1868, reprintedin THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 91 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 2004)).
97. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
art. 9, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 96, at 27
[hereinafter Brussels Declaration]. The criteria, set forth in Article 9 of the Declaration,
strikingly resemble those later adopted in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Printer,
supra note 86, at 363.
98. Brussels Declaration, supra note 97, arts. 11, 17. The Oxford Manual reiterated
this principle, stating that "[t]he laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited
liberty as to the means of injuring the enemy." Laws of War on Land art. 4, Sept. 9, 1880,
reprintedin THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 96, at 29 [hereinafter Oxford
Manual]. Protocol I provides the latest expression of the principle cited above: "In any
armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 35.
99. Oxford Manual, supra note 98, arts. 1, 7 (stating that there must be "a distinction
between the individuals who compose the 'armed force' of a State and its other 'ressortissants,"' and that "[i]t is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive populations.").
100. Given the failure of the Conventions to address civilian immunity, the ICRC
adopted the Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War in 1956 and 1958 (second draft), see, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE DANGERS INCURRED BY THE
CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR (1956), later followed by Resolution XXVIII of
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1977, with the adoption of Additional Protocol I, that the distinction be'°'
tween civilians and combatants was finally set out in treaty language.
' 02
courts.
international
by
blessed
been
Since then, it has repeatedly
3. The Concept of Direct Participationin Hostilities
The task of shaping a regime for transnational terrorists is made even
more difficult by the centrality within the laws of war of the concept of
participation in hostilities. A civilian taking part in hostilities loses his
civilian immunity under the Protocols, at least for the duration of this
participation, is prosecutable for his actions, and is not entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. ' 3
Except where a terrorist actually carries out a bombing or shooting attack (in which case there is little doubt that he or she is taking a "direct
part" in hostilities), ' 4 what constitutes direct participation in situations
the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in 1965, see Resolution
XXVII, Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare,
Oct. 1965, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 96, at 195, and General Assembly Resolution 2675 in 1970 entitled "Basic Principles for the Protection of
Civilian Population in Armed Conflicts," see G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 9, 1970), all of which reaffirmed the principle
of distinction.
101. ROGERS, supra note 55, at 225. Article 48 reads as follows: "In order to ensure
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives." Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 48 (emphasis added).
Rogers also notes that the principle of civilian immunity has been endorsed by the jurisprudence of the International Court for the former Yugoslavia in the Kupreskic, Marti6,
Strugar, and Krsti6 cases. ROGERS, supra note 55, at 227-28 (discussing Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, IT 521-22 (Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Marti6,
Case No. IT-95-11-R61, Rule 61, 10 (Mar. 8, 1996); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT01-42-AR72, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, 1 10 (Nov. 22, 2002); Prosecutor v. Krstid,
Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, 481 (Aug. 2, 2001)).
102. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (July
8, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 809, 827 ("The first [cardinal principle constituting the fabric of humanitarian law] is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and
establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never
make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets."); Prosecutor v. Gali6,
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 45 (Dec. 5, 2003) ("The Trial Chamber recalls that the
provision in question explicitly confirms the customary rule that civilians must enjoy general protection against the danger arising from hostilities. The prohibition against attacking civilians stems from a fundamental principle of international humanitarian law, the
principle of distinction, which obliges warring parties to distinguish at all times between the
civilian population and combatants .... " (footnote omitted)).
103. Protocol I, supra note 52, art. 51(3); Protocol II, supra note 52, arts. 4, 13(3).
104. See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 618
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1987); NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THIRD
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involving terrorists can be far more complex'0 5 : is the individual driving
the terrorist to the site of the attack taking a direct part in hostilities? Is
the individual who obtained a fake identity card for the perpetrator of the
act of terror? Is the terrorist's friend, who knew of the deadly project,
and put him in touch with the "right" people to carry it out?
Efforts to clarify what is meant by "direct participation in hostilities"
have only highlighted the lack of consensus on the contours of the concept and the difficulty of applying the concept to modern warfare. While,
for example, "hostitilies" has generally been interpreted as covering
preparations and return from attack (i.e., non-forceful actions),' the
view has recently been taken that an act must involve the use of force in
order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities.i 7 Similarly, if actual
harm was typically viewed as a prerequisite of direct participation, less
direct harm is now more commonly being regarded as sufficient.' Even
international courts are unable to speak with one voice when it comes to
direct participation: whereas they have at times interpreted "direct participation" as including members of the armed forces who have laid down

EXPERT MEETING ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES:
SUMMARY
REPORT (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/

htmlalllparticipation-hostilities-ihl-311205/$File/Direct participation-in-hostilities_2005_e
ng.pdf; Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?, 75 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 79-80 (2004); McDonald, supra note 55, at 1, 16 ("[I1t is generally and
increasingly considered that there are many activities which involve a more indirect role
for civilians ... yet which are considered as direct participation in hostilities"). See generally Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1995).
105. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 731 (highlighting borderline cases in which this determination is more difficult to make).
106. According to the Commentary on the Additional Protocols,the expression "hostitlies" covers "not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also,
for example, the time that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which he undertakes
hostile acts without using a weapon." INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 104, at
618-19.
107. Jean-Franqois Queguiner, Direct Participationin Hostilities Under International
HumanitarianLaw 2 (Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research at Harvard
Univ., Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/briefing
3297.pdf.
108. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Dec. 14, 2006),
para. 33, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
(holding that acts that by nature are intended to cause damage to civilians constitute direct
participation); Michael N. Schmitt, HumanitarianLaw and Direct Participationin Hostilities by Private Contractorsand Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 533 (2005) (considering that an action that a perpetrator knew would harm the enemy in a relatively direct
and immediate way amounts to direct participation).
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their arms;' at others they have rallied themselves to a case-by-case basis
approach." °
While it is apparent that the concept of taking a direct part in hostilities
is too imprecise to be helpful, the definition of combatant provided by
the Conventions' offers little more guidance on where transnational
terrorists may fit within the laws of war."2 By definition, transnational
terrorists do not belong to the regular forces of a state party -they constitute irregular forces fighting either against or alongside regular armed
forces, outside the State's full or direct control. As members of militia or
volunteer corps, they would fail to qualify as combatants because they are
extremely unlikely to have a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance, as
required by Article 4(2)(b) of the Third Geneva Convention; they very
often carry arms secretly, unlike what is prescribed by Article 4(2)(c);
and, one would imagine, they do not tend to act in accordance with the
laws and customs of war, as per Article 4(2)(d)."3
To conclude, it would seem that under the laws of war as they are currently formulated, transnational terrorists are neither civilians nor combatants."4 Regarded by some as a kind of hybrid category, they have at

109. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 582
(Sept. 2, 1998).
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 616 (May 7, 1997);
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr., para. 34. The case-by-case basis approach, whereby the determination of an individual's status should be made on a case-bycase basis depending on the activity he was engaged in at the time of attack or capture, is
increasingly taking hold. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 108, at 534. The main challenge
with such an approach is that it implies that the status determination be made ex post
facto. It would be preferable-in order to allow for some predictability and legal certainty-if the decision whether a given individual constitutes a legitimate target could be
made ex ante.
111. A combatant is defined as a person who falls into one of the following categories:
a member of the regular armed forces of a belligerent party, or a member of a militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling five cumulative conditions: (1) "be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates," (2) "have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance," (3) "carry arms openly," (4) "conduct their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war," and (5) be linked to a party to the conflict. See Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 1, arts. 1-3. This definition is also used by Article 4 to the Third
Geneva Convention to define prisoners of war. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 2,
art. 4.
112. As noted above, the "combatant," strictly speaking, is only a feature of international armed conflict. For the purposes of this section, I ask the theoretical question of
whether transnational terrorists-whatever the type of conflict-could be considered combatants within the meaning of the Conventions.
113. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 730-31.
114. See Newton, supra note 58, at 84 (claiming that al Qaeda members neither meet
the criteria for prisoner of war nor qualify for the protections accorded to civilians); Paust,
supra note 35, at 1342 (arguing that members of al Qaeda cannot be combatants, much less
unlawful combatants, or prisoners of war).
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times been characterized as unlawful combatants or unlawful belligerents- concepts that are themselves ill-defined."'
Courts forced to deal with non-state participants in hostilities, too, have
struggled with their proper characterization under the Conventions. The
Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin held that members of the German
forces who had penetrated the United States illegally and in civilian
clothing should not be treated as prisoners of war because they could not
be characterized as combatants under the Conventions.1 6 Without a
clear frame of reference to rely on, the Supreme Court defined them as
"unlawful combatants 11 7 and denied them both combatant and prisoner
of war status. An Israeli Military Court adopted the same terminology
with respect to members of the PFLP, finding that they do not conduct
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war and belong to an organization for which no State is responsible.
The court
found that the Geneva Conventions apply "to relations between States
and not between a State and bodies which are not States and do not represent States."'' 9 However, in late 2006 the Supreme Court of Israel moved
115. It is important to acknowledge here the argument that there would be a third
category of individuals, referred to as "unlawful" or "illegal" combatants, namely those
civilians who take up arms without being authorized to do so by international law. See
Printer, supra note 86, at 368; see also Interview with Sir David Frost of BBC Television,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1631-32 (Nov. 12, 2003). Others, however, maintain that
there are only two categories of individuals. See ANTONIO CASSESE, EXPERT OPINION
ON WHETHER ISRAEL'S TARGETED KILLINGS OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS IS
CONSONANT
WITH
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW para. 26
(2003),

http://www.stoptorture.org.il//eng/images/uploadedlpublications/64.pdf
(written at the
request of the petitioners in Public Committee Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel); see also 4
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF

CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 56 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); Richard R. Baxter, SoCalled 'Unprivileged Belligerency':Spies, Guerrillas,and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.

323, 324-25 (1951); Charles Garraway, Interoperabilityand the Atlantic Divide-A Bridge
Over Troubled Waters, 341 ISRAELI Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 105, 107-17 (2004) (using the
"unprivileged belligerent" terminology); Michael H. Hoffman, Terrorists Are Unlawful
Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction with Implications for the Future of
InternationalHumanitarian Law, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 227, 229 (2002). On the
qualification of "unlawful combatants," consider the United States government's decision
that the Geneva Conventions apply to members of the Taliban forces detained in Guantanamo but not to members of al Qaeda. Jim Garamone, Geneva Convention Applies to
Taliban, not Al Qaeda, AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE, Feb. 7, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/nO2072002-200202074.html; see also YORAM
DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES

UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

ARMED CONFLICT 47-50 (2004); Brooks, supra note 54, at 731, 734; Newton, supra note

58, at 76; Printer, supra note 86, at 368.
116. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,35-37,48 (1942).
117. Id. at 31, 35-37.
118. Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 I.L.R. 470,474-76,483 (Isr. Military Ct. 1969).
119. Id. at 475 (emphasis added). The Israel Military Court refers to members of terrorist organizations who operate in civilian clothing as "unlawful combatants." Id. at 476.
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away from the "unlawful combatant" qualification
and held that terror20
ists are civilians taking part in hostilities.
The United States Supreme Court, too, was recently offered the opportunity to clarify its position vis-A-vis individuals who do not belong to a
national army but have been captured by the United States as part of an
armed conflict. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court dealt with the case of a
U.S. citizen who had been detained in Afghanistan and subsequently
transferred to U.S. custody.12 ' Designated as an "unlawful combatant" by
the Department of Defense, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that,
as a U.S. citizen, Hamdi was entitled to more-although the Court did
not give much guidance as to the extent of rights.'2 What is notable,
however, is that the Court did not explicitly reject the enemy combatant
qualification of the Department of Defense.' 3 Similarly, in Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, a U.S. citizen who had been detained as a material federal witness whose testimony might be needed in a related investigation, was
designated as "enemy combatant" by the President and kept in custody
without being charged of any crime.' 24 Once again, the Court carefully
avoided addressing the core question of whether
Padilla was appropri1 5
ately characterized as an enemy combatant.
Taken with the formalistic international/internal distinction, the civilian/combatant divide shows the difficulty of holding on to outdated assumptions and highlights the Conventions' inability to provide for modern terrorism. Other analytical frameworks, however, can be helpful in
shaping an accountability regime for transnational terrorists. But before
turning to these complementary frameworks, it is instructive to consider
yet another challenge terrorism has been said to pose to the traditional
laws of war, namely, the assumption that parties to a conflict act with
reciprocity.
4. Implications of the Lack of Reciprocity on the Applicability of the
Conventions
International humanitarian law builds on the notion that a state is generally willing to grant another state's citizens certain protections it wishes
to be guaranteed to its own: it is assumed that reciprocity will limit the
inhumane treatment of enemies. This assumption is borne out, to some
extent, by international armed conflicts between states-particularly in
120. See generally HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Dec. 14,
2006), para. 33, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/Files.ENG/02/690/007/a34/
02007690.a34.pdf.
121. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509-10 (2004) (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 509.
123. Id. at 509-11.
124. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-32 (2004).
125. See id. at 451.
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the context of the treatment of prisoners of war.126 But the2 concept
of
7
reciprocity tends to be absent in conflicts involving non-states.
Divergence of opinion on the implications of the lack of reciprocity in
conflict involving transnational terror networks reflects the duality of
purpose of the Conventions. On one hand, the Conventions can be
viewed as establishing a set of interdependent obligations among states.
According to this line of thought, belligerents cease to be bound when a
party violates its side of the bargain. Therefore, proponents of this interpretation regard the absence of reciprocity as fatal to the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions. 2 9
If, on the other hand, the Conventions are viewed as having been designed primarily to protect civilians from the excesses of warfare, the
Conventions must continue to apply even when reciprocity has ceased.3
For the sake of civilians, the entire system cannot break down when reciprocity is missing, because it would negate the humanitarian character
of the Conventions.
Had the drafters wished to emphasize the first purpose (states' expectation to be bound by a uniform set of norms), they certainly would have
explicitly conditioned the Conventions upon reciprocity. The reality,
however, is quite different. While Common Article 2 to the Geneva
126. See Belz, supra note 19, at 118. States may also grant prisoner of war status to
non-state actors. Consider the United States' treatment of the Vietcong (as compared to
its treatment of al Qaeda) and Israel's treatment of Hizbullah (at times). See id. at 118.
127. Insurgents, in particular, are not known for their adherence to the norms of humanitarian law. Consider, for example, the treatment of captured government forces by
Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Communist Party of Nepal, and the Philippines' Abu Sayyaf. But states, too, are given to inhumane treatment of insurgents, particularly since insurgent movements tend to be more common in undemocratic countries. See
RENt PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 161-62
(2002).
128. PROVOST, supra note 127, at 172-73.
129. Belz, supra note 19, at 115 (noting that "[r]eciprocity is a vital element" in the
utilitarian approach to the laws of war); James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common
Conjectures, and Legal Systems in InternationalPolitics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 43 (2002)
("Laws of war can be effective only to the extent that the parties can enforce them against
one another; they must possess both the ability and the willingness to make the treaty
work."); see also II GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLIcr 452 (1968).

130. In support of the view that the purpose of the Conventions is mainly humanitarian, see PROVOST, supra note 127, at 137 (noting that the importance of reciprocity is
likely to diminish-but not disappear-as the laws of war become more "humanitarian");
Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 185 (2005); Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A CriticalHistory of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 56
(1994).
131. PROVOST, supra note 127, at 171. This also seems to be the view taken by the
commentators of the Conventions. See 4 COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 15 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1958).
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Conventions (which deals with international armed conflict) notes that
the Conventions should bind state parties in their "mutual relations,"
nothing of the sort is mentioned in Common Article 3 with regard to internal armed conflict. 112 This discrepancy shows that while the drafters
were mindful of the absence of "mutuality of obligations," such absence
was not viewed as affecting states' obligations.'33 In fact, Articles 51, 52,
131, and 148 of the Conventions preclude the parties from excusing 3any
4
grave breach by another party's non-execution of its own obligations.'
That reciprocity is not vital to the Conventions is further illustrated by
Article 1 of the Conventions and Protocol I, which provides that the parties should "undertake to respect and ensure respect" of the Conventions
and Protocol.'
This undertaking "is not based on any consideration in
the form of the creation of similar obligations on behalf of other state
parties to the Conventions and Protocol.' ' 136 In other words, the absence
of reciprocity in conflict involving transnational terror groups and individuals does not in and of itself render the Geneva Conventions-or the
laws of war generally -wholly inapplicable to such conflicts.
B. Looking for Purpose:Origins of the Distinction Between Civiliansand
Combatants
Because the Geneva Conventions appear, in many ways, ill-equipped
to deal with individuals resorting to transnational terror, one has to look
elsewhere for guidance. I suggest looking back at the reasons that initially brought philosophers and legal scholars to the conclusion that civilians should be spared from attacks.
The principle of distinction that, as noted above, had become embedded into the laws of war long before the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, historically rested on the belief that certain persons, because they
are presumed innocent, cannot lawfully be targeted. 7 As early as the
132. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, arts. 2-3; see also Jinks, supra note
130, at 191-92.
133. See Jinks, supra note 130, at 192. One cannot really speak of "mutual relations" in
internal armed conflicts, as the incentives for reciprocal treatment are largely missing in
state/non-state conflicts. See Belz, supra note 19, at 98 ("[W]ars between states and nonstate actors involve no reciprocity, because terrorist organizations lack all motivation to
observe humanitarian law, and states are unwilling to do so unilaterally."). In addition,
non-state groups often lack a commitment to the laws of war or, for that matter, to any
laws at all-so one can hardly speak of reciprocity in their regard. See id. at 114.
134. PROVOST, supra note 127, at 132.
135. E.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 2, art. 1.
136. PROVOST, supra note 127, at 137.
137. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 257 (1994) ("[Tjhere were
categories of nominally 'enemy' human beings whom it was possible and desirable not to
hurt, persons whose degree of non-involvement in the struggle or whose irrelevance to it
commonly led to their characterization as 'innocent."').
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sixteenth century, it was considered wrong to kill innocents in wartime.
Francisco de Vitoria articulated specific limitations on the conduct of
war-including the prohibition against targeting "innocents," such as
women and children:
[I]t is never lawful in itself intentionally to kill innocent persons
.... It follows that even in wars against the Turks we may not kill
children, who are obviously innocent, nor women, who are to be
presumed innocent.138
Vitoria did, however, envisage situations in which an innocent person
could become guilty and, as a result, a legitimate target. 139 The difficulty
thus lies in determining when innocence is lost and what it means: what
makes a person "innocent" or-to use today's terminology-what defines
a noncombatant? According to Vitoria, the act of taking arms makes one
a combatant:
[I]f the hostages would otherwise be combatants, for instance if
they have already borne arms against us, they may be executed;
but if they are non-combatants, it is clear from what has been said
that they may not.
The concepts of innocence and harmlessness continue to resonate in
the work of contemporary scholars such as Thomas Nagel, 1'4 Brian
Orend, 42 Michael Walzer, 43 and Daniel Zupan.' 44 They, like Vitoria, regard certain categories of persons (children are one example) as harmless
no matter what they do, while others can be combatants or noncombatants depending on the circumstances. Applied to transnational terrorists,
the concepts of innocence, harmlessness, and the bearing of arms would
militate in favor of treating them as combatants.
The principle of distinction also finds its origins and purpose in the just
war tradition which legitimizes the killing of civilians by the pursuit of a
just war.145 Thus, the determination of who can or cannot be targeted
138.

FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 293, 314-

15 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (1557) (emphasis omitted).
139. See id. at 135 (presuming women to be innocent "unless, that is, it can be proved
of a particular women [sic] that she was implicated in guilt").
140. Id. at 319 (emphasis omitted).
141.

THOMAS NAGEL, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 140 (1972) (argu-

ing that combatants should be distinguished from noncombatants "on the basis of their
immediate threat of harmfulness.").
142. BRIEN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 107, 110, 113 (2006) (repeatedly using
words such as "non-threatening," "innocent," "non-harming," "engaged in harming,"
"engaged in harm," "dangerous," and "serious external threats").
143. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 146 (3d ed. 2000) (defining innocence as "a term of art which means that [innocent people] have done nothing, and are
doing nothing, that entails the loss of their rights").
144.

See generally DANIEL ZUPAN, WAR, MORALITY AND AUTONOMY (2004).

145.

Saint Thomas Aquinas defined the requirements of a just war:
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rests primarily upon the "justness" of a belligerent's cause, rather than
upon the higher moral status of certain segments of the population. As
George Mavrodes, a lively proponent of the just war theory, writes:
If one's cause is unjust then one ought not to kill noncombatants.
But that is because of the independent moral prohibition against
prosecuting such a war at all, and has nothing to do with any special immunity of noncombatants. 146
Conversely, Mavrodes writes:
If one's cause is just, but the slaying of noncombatants will not
advance it to any marked degree, then one ought not to slay
them. But this is just the requirement of proportionality, and applies equally and in the same way to combatants. If one's cause is
just and the slaying of combatants would advance it... this is the
crucial case.147
This theory is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it gives
precedence to the moral value of the war over the moral status of the
targeted individual-who should always remain the primary consideration. In addition, if embraced by both sides to a conflict, this rationalization of combatancy status could have dramatic consequences: both sides,
believing they are waging a "just" war, could indiscriminately kill civilians
in order to achieve their military objectives. Finally, and this is a problem
inherent to the just war doctrine, determining who is a legitimate target
would require a difficult and subjective judgment of the morality of a
war. For example, where a terrorist's cause is deemed "just," the killing
of civilians would be allowed. For all these reasons, the articulation of
combatancy status under the just war theory provides little guidance on
transnational terrorists.

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the
sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a
private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from
the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to
summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime....
Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be
attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault....
Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.... For it may happen
that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet rendered unlawful through a wicked intention."
2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1359-60 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., 1947) (n.d.) (pt. II-11, q. 40, art. 1).
146. George I. Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.

117, 129 (1975).
147. Id.; see also VITORIA, supra note 138, at 316 ("Finally, it is never lawful to kill
innocent people, even accidentally and unintentionally, except when it advances a just war
which cannot be won in any other way.").
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The circumstances in which killing a noncombatant may be justified
have been further rationalized under the principle of double effect (also
referred to as the Doctrine of Double Effect, or DDE). The principle
was first formulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas;' 4' later, the French Jesuit
Jean Pierre Gury gave the doctrine its more modem formulation. 49 According to the DDE, it is permissible to perform an action that causes
serious harm, if such harm is incident to a positive effect. 50 Because the
bad action is brought about merely incidentally or unintentionally, it becomes morally acceptable under the doctrine.
As applied to warfare, the DDE holds that it is morally permissible to
kill noncombatants so long as four conditions are met: "(1) the agent's
end must be morally acceptable (honestus), (2) the cause must be good or
at least indifferent, (3) the good effect must be immediate, and (4) there
must be a grave reason" and sufficient proportionality. 5 ' The doctrine
thus rests on the fundamental distinction between the intended and the
unintended outcomes of actions taken in wartime:
When the errant bomb falls by accident on the civilian house, we
are indeed doing wrong, but we are doing right, too, if that bomb
had 5meant
to fall on the weapons and war machinery of the
2
evil.
Unlike the absolutist theories, which assert that it is never permissible
to kill noncombatants, 53 the principle of double effect sets forth a kind of
balancing test between the prohibition against attacking noncombatants
and military necessity. 4 It points to the intent behind a specific act as the
determinant factor in the unlawful killing of noncombatants-which is
acceptable only if their deaths are unintended consequences of an act.'
148.

See 2 AQUINAS, supra note 145, at 1471-72 (pt. II-II, q. 64, art. 7).

149.

Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understandingthe Principle of Double Effect, 90

ETHICS 527, 528 (1980).
150. See id. at 528-32.
151. Id. at 528.
152. PETER S. TEMES, THE JUST WAR 167 (2003); see also Mavrodes, supra note 146,
at 130-31.
153. For example, G.E.M. Anscombe and Thomas Nagel contend that it is always
morally impermissible to kill noncombatants intentionally-even as an unintended side
effect. G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A CATHOLIC
RESPONSE 45, 48-51, 59-60 (G.E.M. Anscombe et al. eds., 1961); Nagel, supra note 141, at
133-43.

154. WALZER, supra note 143, at 153.
155. Alternatively stated by Michael Walzer, "it is permitted to perform an act likely to
have evil consequences (the killing of noncombatants)," provided that these four conditions are fulfilled. Id. Walzer actually offers a restatement of the third condition (that the
good effect be immediate) to require not only that the good be achieved, but also that "the
foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible." Id. at 155. What is very interesting about
Walzer is that he is trying to find a balance between the risks taken by soldiers and the
avoidance of harm to civilians: how far must soldiers go in saving civilians' lives? Id. at
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Although the DDE constitutes a valuable framework within which the
morality of actions taken by individuals can be assessed, it does not offer
insight into the legal status of transnational terrorists.
Like the just war theory, the rationale provided by the DDE is more
useful in establishing the illegality of an act of terror ex post facto than in
determining the legal status of an individual ab initio. By contrast, the
theory of innocence offers workable criteria (innocence, harmlessness,
and the bearing of arms) on which to base a status determination. Under
the theory of innocence-which is at the very origin of the laws of wartransnational terrorists would be considered combatants. The following
section will test the morality of this normative conclusion.
C. Morality: Moral Underpinningsof the Laws of War
Section A of this Article suggested how a historical analysis of the origins of the distinction between combatants and civilians might provide
guidance as to where terrorists fall within the traditional framework.
Section B concluded that an argument exists for treating terrorists as
combatants under the theory of innocence. This section looks into the
moral suitability of this normative conclusion by uncovering the moral
underpinnings of the distinction between civilians and combatants.
1. The Moral Underpinnings of the DistinctionBetween Civilians and
Combatants
The complicated relationship between war and morality has fascinated
philosophers, jurists and political scientists alike-all of whom have tried
to identify the moral values that should guide the conduct of war.
Often, the considerations at the root of military decisions-such as a
soldier's willingness to shoot-are grounded in morality more than in
116
law.
Michael Walzer attempted to rationalize the considerations that
might lead a soldier not to shoot the enemy-in spite of his/her right (and
duty) to do so. 7 To illustrate his point, Walzer relates stories of soldiers
15 8
who refrained from shooting because the enemy "looked too funny,',
was taking a bath 59 or was running away holding his trousers with both
hands.' 6 In these situations, Wazler explains, a restoration of humanity

155-56. He concludes that "civilians have a right that 'due care' be taken." Id. at 156. It is
about striking a balance between military necessity and the protection of civilians, and
Walzer is exposing the problem with a unique concern for practical and real-life situations.
Id. at 151-59.
156. Id. at 139.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 140.
160. Id.
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occurs by virtue of which6 the enemy becomes a "man" and regains his
1
previously lost immunity.1
In one of the stories, a soldier reflects as one of the enemy combatants
he is supposed to target lights up a cigarette:
This cigarette formed an invisible link between us. No sooner did
I see its smoke than I wanted a cigarette myself .... I knew it was
my duty to fire.... I reasoned like this: To lead a hundred, even a
thousand, men against another hundred, or thousand, was one
thing; but to detach one man from the rest and say to him, as it
were: "Don't move, I'm going to shoot you. I'm going to kill
you"-that was different... To fight is one thing, but to kill a
man is another. And to kill him like that is to murder him.' 62
Although it would not have been against the rules of war as we currently understand them to shoot the enemy soldier while he was smoking
a163bath, holding up his
a cigarette or because he looked funny, was taking
•
pants, reveling in the sun, or smoking a cigarette, these stories show
that moral considerations do sometimes come in the way of the laws of
war. It is precisely for this reason that morality should play a greater role
in the determination of who is a combatant. 64 The nature of the activity
performed by an individual is what should make the difference between 65a
combatant and a man (i.e., a civilian) performing an inoffensive task.'
In sum, a morality-based assessment of combatancy would suggest a disassociation between the status of the individual, on the one hand, and the
activity he performs, on the other hand.
The idea of a disassociation between status and activity can be traced
back to Rousseau. Although he did not expressly frame his argument in
morality, he did, as mentioned above, refer to the "man" behind the soldier: when the soldier has laid down his weapons, he is no longer an enemy but regains his humanity and ceases to be a legitimate target.' 66 This
understanding of the meaning of combatant is the one later adopted by
the Hague Regulations -that members of the armed forces are either
161
combatants or noncombatants depending on their functions. It was also
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 141-42 (third omission in original).
Id. at 142.
On the general importance of moral considerations in the conduct of war, see

MICHAEL I. HANDEL, MASTERS OF WAR 85 (3d rev. ed. 2002) (citing CARL VON
CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 184,213 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 1976)).
165. WALZER, supra note 143, at 145 (noting how we "draw a line between those who

have lost their rights because of their warlike activities and those who have not" (emphasis
added)).
166. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
167. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 1, art. 3, provided that the armed forces
consisted of both combatants and noncombatants (chaplains and medical personnel, for
example). At the time, it was thought that, depending on his function, a soldier could be
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recently validated when international tribunals held that civilians include
members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms. Applied
to transnational terrorists, a morality-based interpretation of the meaning
of combatant would acknowledge that one does not have to be a member
of a state's armed forces to be a combatant and that it should depend
instead on whether one engages in warlike activities-especially in the
eyes of the enemy.
2. Moral Desirabilityof Treating Terrorists as Combatants
Treating transnational terrorists as combatants would place soldiers
and terrorists on the same legal (and moral) footing. The second prong
of the moral analysis looks into the moral desirability of this outcome.
Soldiers are usually individuals who share similar values, aspirations,
ethics, a great deal of patriotism, and, most importantly, a concern for
civilians' lives. Terrorists, on the other hand, use indiscriminate tactics to
achieve political ends at best, mere terror at worst. They rarely respect
the laws of war and do not value their or others' right to life. The question is whether this type of fighter deserves to be put on the same footing
and granted the same protections as members of the regular armed
forces. By doing so, are terrorists being upgraded from outlaws to respectable players?
Amos Guiora points to this undesirable effect when he argues that one
(unintended) result of the war on terror is that it essentially equates al
Qaeda to a state and bin Laden to a head of state, thereby giving both
enhanced standing. 69 More generally, it has been argued that codifying
war has legitimized its conduct."O In the same way, shaping a legal regime for terrorists-so it could be argued-would further legitimize unacceptable uses of force.17'
The question of whether more (or fewer) norms are necessary is repeatedly encountered in international law. With respect to unilateral
either a combatant (if he was involved in combat) or a noncombatant (if he was not).
Today, this definition seems illogical, since members of the armed forces are now, by definition, combatants.
168. See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, 282 (Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 582 (Sept. 2, 1998).
169. See Amos Guiora, Where Are Terrorists To Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of
Rights Grantedto Suspected Terrorists,56 CATH. U. L. REV. 805 (2007).
170. See Jochnick & Normand, supra note 130 (arguing that the codification and formalization of the laws of war had the effect of legitimizing the conduct of war and atrocities, and did nothing for the protection of civilians); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 294 (2006) (arguing that the Deed of Commitment
for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action, whereby non-state actors undertake not to use landmines, "endow[s] the non-state
actor with some sort of enhanced moral status").
171. Cf id.
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humanitarian intervention, to take only one example, the argument has
been made in some quarters that codifying this exceptional recourse to
force would only legitimize it."' Domestic criminal law may offer some
insight into dealing with this question: the fact is that behaviors such as
domestic violence or downloading music or software from the Internet
(and even more serious offenses such as rape and murder) have not been
rendered morally acceptable by their criminalization. There is no reason
why the situation should be any different with transnational terrorism.
To conclude, a study of the original logic and purpose of combatancy
status and a morality-based assessment of such status show that there is
no serious legal or moral impediment to treating transnational terrorists
as combatants-and that any trade-off is well worth it.173 In particular,
the possibility of granting transnational terrorists prisoner of war status
would be outweighed by their being legitimate targets.
CONCLUSION

The substantive law applicable to non-state actors' recourse to force is
scarce. This Article has provided some preliminary thoughts on how we
might be able to shape a regime governing the use of force by transnational terrorist organizations both ad bellum and in bello.
With regard to the jus ad bellum, I have suggested that Articles 2(4)
and 51 of the UN Charter be extended to situations of recourse to force
by and against terrorist organizations. In particular, states should be allowed to act in self-defense in response to an armed attack by a terrorist
organization.
With regard to the jus in bello, this Article dealt with the question of
what norms of international humanitarian law govern wars fought against
non-state entities such as terrorist organizations and what the status of
these entities should be. The answer does not lie only in the somewhat
inflexible Geneva Conventions and accompanying Protocols. Rather,
this Article tried to show, the answer could be drawn from an introspective questioning on the logic and purpose of such laws, combined with a
morality-based assessment of combatancy status. These two analytical
172.

See Daphn6 Richemond, Normativity in InternationalLaw: The Case of Unilateral

HumanitarianIntervention, 6 YALE HuM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 73-74 (2003) (comparing

unilateral humanitarian intervention and euthanasia).
173. The question of whether transnational terrorists should be entitled to prisoner of
war status goes beyond the scope of this Article. Technically, treating terrorists as combatants implies that terrorists are entitled to prisoner of war status. However, given the
outdated assumptions on which the Geneva Conventions rest, the question of whether
transnational terrorists are entitled to prisoner of war status would have to be analyzed in
light of this Article's two suggested tools, namely, the study of the historical purpose that
guided the development of the prisoner of war regime and a morality-based assessment of
the suitability of granting such extended protections to transnational terrorists.
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guides (purpose and morality) would point toward a treatment of transnational terrorists as combatants under international humanitarian lawboth in international and, to the extent possible, internal armed conflicts.
This proposal would be faithful to the spirit of the traditional laws of war,
morally suitable, and practically expedient.
In sum, to say that international law is unable to deal with the increased
recourse to force by non-state entities is not wrong, but it is inaccurate.
International law simply happens to have been built on a number of assumptions that are no longer evident today: (1) that states wage war
against states; (2) that civilians and combatants are easily distinguishable;
and (3) that reciprocity is a given. This Article's main point was to show
that no revolutionary concepts or new norms of international law are
necessary to deal with transnational terrorism. Instead, it might even be
possible to shape a regime that would complete existing norms in their
application to transnational terrorist organizations, while remaining
truthful to the principles that guided their adoption in the first place, and
acknowledging how today's reality has distorted the old assumptions.
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